Alternative Approaches to the Distinction between Commercial and Noncommercial Speech: Fargo Women\u27s Health Organization v. Larson by Kirk, Terry
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 4 Summer 1987 Article 6 
Alternative Approaches to the Distinction between Commercial 
and Noncommercial Speech: Fargo Women's Health Organization 
v. Larson 
Terry Kirk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Terry Kirk, Alternative Approaches to the Distinction between Commercial and Noncommercial Speech: 
Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Larson, 36 DePaul L. Rev. 583 (1987) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol36/iss4/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND NONCOMMERCIAL
SPEECH: FARGO WOMEN'S HEALTH ORGANIZATION
v. LARSON
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is
elusive and the criteria used to differentiate the two manifold. Differen-
tiating criteria include motive,' context,2 interests protected,3 common
1. Economic or profit motive has been considered by a number of courts in their
analyses of whether speech is commercial or noncommercial. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (promotion of energy use by public utility); Citizens for a
Better Env't v. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (canvassing by nonprofit organi-
zation); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (commercial optometrist advertising); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (price advertising
for -prescription drugs); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertising by out-of-state
abortion clinic); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (distribution of handbills pro-
moting submarine tours); Pennsylvania Pub. Interest Coalition v. York Township, 569 F. Supp.
1398 (1983) (phone solicitation by charitable organization); Spiritual Psychic Science Church v.
Azusa, 39 Cal. 3d 501, 703 P.2d 1119, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985) (ban on fortune telling).
2. Commercial context, including the form of the speech as a paid advertisement, the
medium in which it appears, and whether the speech is sold or distributed free, has been
discussed as a factor in several commercial speech cases. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) (display of contraceptive products); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975) (abortion advertising has newsworthy aspects); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (help-wanted advertising in sex-designated
newspaper column); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (editorial advertisement
criticizing police action); Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1985) (on-campus selling of
socialist organization newspaper); United States S.W. Afr./Namibia Trade & Cultural Council
v. United States, 708 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (government-sponsored travel poster); Penthouse
Int'l v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (advertising poster containing a caricature
of a presidential candidate).
3. A state's interest in protecting its citizens from fraud, deception, and annoyances,
or promoting their health or economic welfare, has been considered in defining speech as
commercial. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(state's interest in protecting safety of fair patrons justifies restrictions on literature distribution);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (commercial billboards banned to
promote safety and aesthetics); Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (state interest in conserving energy can be satisfied by less restrictive means than banning
promotional inserts); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(useful information derived from billing inserts on controversial public issues); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (state can regulate attorney solicitation under circumstances
likely to pose danger to consumer); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(state's claim that contraceptive advertising is offensive and embarrassing insufficient to justify
suppression); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
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sense,' and the nature of and extent to which public issues are involved.'
Unfortunately, the distinction is critical. With certain narrow exceptions, non-
commercial speech enjoys full first amendment protection and is not subject
to government regulation,' while commercial speech is not entitled to the
same degree of constitutional protection and may be regulated by the
government.'
denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (state may regulate deceptive or misleading information about
effect of food on health); Massachusetts Fair Share, Inc. v. Town of Rockland, 610 F. Supp.
682 (D. Mass. 1985) (door-to-door solicitations cannot be banned to prevent crime or annoy-
ance); Meadowbrook Women's Clinic, P.A. v. State of Minn., 557 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Minn.
1983) (state failed to assert valid interest for prohibiting abortion advertising in telephone
book).
4. A few courts have noted that common sense is the best indicator of whether speech
is commercial or noncommercial. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1984) (commercial speech doctrine rests heavily on commonsense distinction); Penthouse Int'l
v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (common sense distinction must be drawn
between political and commercial speech). See also Moore, Justice Blackmun's Contributions
on the Court: The Commercial Speech and State Taxation Examples, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 29,
41 (1985) ("common sense" differences between commercial and other types of speech justified
greater willingness to tolerate regulations aimed at deceptive commercial speech).
5. The nature of the issue involved in the speech is a public one, and the extent to
which it is implicated, contributes to the difficulty of categorizing speech. See Bolger v. Young
Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (contraception); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v.
Shcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (family planning services and abortion); Central Hudson Gas v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (energy); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (public utility); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (ACLU
representation of welfare recipient); Bates v. State Bar Ass'n, 433 U.S. 350 (1978) (attorneys'
fees for routine services); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (conduct of state licensed pharmacists); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975) (abortion); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973) (sex-related employment advertising).
6. Four categories of speech have been excluded from first amendment protection
because they are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942). These four categories include: fighting words, id.; obscenity, Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957); defamatory falsehoods, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974);
and speech carrying a clear and present danger of incitement to violence, Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. Azusa, 39 Cal. 3d 501, 703
P.2d 1119, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985) (four categories of speech held not entitled to first
amendment protection); Note, A New Twist in the Abortion Funding Controversy: Planned
Parenthood v. Arizona, 33 DEPAut. L. REv. 835, 845 nn.66-67 (1984) (four categories of
unprotected speech).
7. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1984). See generally Note,
We Can Share the Women, We Can Share the Wine: The Regulation of Alcohol Advertising
on Television, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1107, 1114 (1985) [hereinafter Note, We Can Share the
Women] (Supreme Court repeatedly asserted commercial speech protected differently under
first amendment than other types of speech); Thompson, Antitrust, the First Amendment and
the Communication of Price Information, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 939, 960 (1983) (distinction between
commercial and political speech rests on belief that commercial speech is not as worthy of
constitutional protection as political speech). Cf. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 591, 635 (1982) (different treatment of commercial and noncommercial speech
cannot be justified on premise that "some forms of speech are more valuable than others");
[Vol. 36:583
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In Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Larson,' the North Dakota
Supreme Court refused to extend full first amendment protection to adver-
tising by a "pro-life" clinic. The plaintiff, an abortion clinic, filed an action
for damages and injunctive relief, charging that the defendant used false
and deceptive advertising with the intent of misleading women into believing
that the defendant performed abortions in order to lure them to the Help
Clinic to discuss anti-abortion alternatives. The defendant argued that its
advertising was not commercial speech but instead, noncommercial advocacy
advertising which merited full first amendment protection. The trial court
held that the advertising was commercial speech because it appeared in a
commercial context and it did not meet the standards for noncommercial
speech.9 Finding that the advertising led pregnant women seeking abortions
to believe that they were calling and visiting an abortion clinic, the trial
court judged the advertising deceptive and issued a preliminary injunction
enjoining it.10 The state supreme court agreed with the trial court's charac-
terization of the speech as commercial, but modified the preliminary in-
junction to permit the clinic to use the word "abortion" in future advertising."
In concluding that the lower standard of review for commercial speech be
applied in Fargo, the courts were able to reach an end result that was just.
The pro-life clinic's advertisement was clearly deceptive because it misled the
public about the clinic's anti-abortion philosophy in order to attract women
who wanted abortions or birth control counsel. 2 Even the pro-life clinic's
name, the "Women's Help Clinic of Fargo," seemed calculated to cause
deliberate confusion with the abortion clinic, the "Fargo Women's Health
Organization." But, in order to attack this fraudulent conduct, the court
first had to categorize the advertising as commercial speech.
The potential for shielding deceptive speech from regulation by couching
it in a noncommercial context clearly exists, however, this opportunity is
foreclosed to advertisers like the Women's Help Clinic of Fargo if deceptive
speech is subject to regulation without regard to its categorization as com-
mercial or noncommercial. This Note suggests alternative approaches to the
regulation of clearly deceptive speech in cases where such categorization is
difficult or should be ignored entirely.
I. BACKGROUND
The government may ban commercial speech if it is false" or proposes an
illegal transaction. 4 In addition, truthful commercial speech concerning a
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1212, 1283 (1983) ("lesser importance" rationale for
regulation of commercial speech is wrong).
8. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. I11. 1986).
9. Id. at 181.
10. Id. at 182.
11. Id. at 179.
12. Uehling, Underwood, King, & Burgower, Clinics of Deception, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1,
1986, at 20. See Fargo, 381 N.W.2d at 178 n.1 (reprints of Help Clinic's advertising).
13. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638.
14. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388.
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lawful activity can be regulated if there is a substantial government interest
and the regulation directly advances that interest. 5
Once speech is characterized as commercial, a claim that it is false,
deceptive, or misleading will trigger government review. Speech can be
suppressed only if there is no way to communicate the message nondecep-
tively.16 Typically, the deceptive advertising is enjoined, and corrected non-
deceptive advertising is permitted to run in its place. 7 Currently, requiring
the inclusion of disclosures is the preferred method of remedying deceptive
advertising," although this may not always be the most effective method.' 9
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) standard of deception is "likeliness
to deceive" such that the reasonable consumer will act to his detriment. 20 It
is not necessary to prove actual deception. 2' in applying this standard, courts
have established various criteria to use in their analysis. Courts examine the
context in which the communication appears, 22 the vulnerability of the target
market to the particular message,23 the consideration of the advertising in
its entirety,2 and the advertiser's intent. 25
The art of defining deception in commercial speech is somewhat more
precise than is the classification of speech as commercial or noncommercial.
This classification, however, is the threshold issue in every deception case. 26
15. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
16. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (can ban "inherently misleading" ads); Central
Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (to come within first amendment
protection, commercial speech cannot be misleading); FTC v. Brown and Williamson Corp.,
778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (potentially misleading information can be prohibited if information
cannot be presented in a way that is not deceptive).
17. Zauderer, 471 .U.S. at 651.
18. Thompson Medical Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
19. Brown and Williamson, 778 F.2d at 44-45. See Litton Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 676 F.2d
364 (9th Cir. 1982) (fine print disclosures inadequate for remedying important deceptive infor-
mation but reasonable for qualifying information of only limited relevance); Warner-Lambert
Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (pro forma disclaimers may not cure deceptive
messages). See also Letter from FTC Chairman James C. Miller III to Hon. John D. Dingell
11-13 (Oct. 14, 1983) (discussing FTC Deception Policy Enforcement Statement which recognizes
consumers may not always read disclosures so disclosures must be clear and conspicuous). Cf.
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-66 (appropriate remedy is to require corrective information
to appear in whatever form necessary to remedy deception).
20. Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986).
21. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d
at 164. But see Brown and Williamson, 778 F.2d at 39-41 (if language is vague, need some
evidence of public perception); Avis Rent A Car System v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 385 (2d
Cir. 1986) (need some evidence of tendency to deceive).
22. Thompson Medical Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986); FTC v. Sterling
Drug, 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).
23. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454; Avis Rent A Car System, 782 F.2d at 386.
24. Sterling Drug, 317 F.2d at 674.
25. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Sterling Drug, 317 F.2d at
672-74; Plough, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods., 532 F. Supp. 714, 717-18 (D. Del.
1982).
26. See supra note 6 for exceptions.
[Vol. 36:583
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A. Commercial or Noncommercial Speech?
The importance of the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech began in 1942 with Valentine v. Chrestensen.27 The Supreme Court
established the "commercial speech doctrine," holding that speech of a
purely commercial nature was not entitled to first amendment protection. 21
The issue in Valentine was the public distribution of handbills in violation
of a local sanitary code. 29 The Court, recognizing that government may not
restrict the dissemination of opinion or the communication of political or
social information,30 held that the same restrictions did not apply to "purely
commercial" speech which existed merely to serve the economic interests of
the speaker.3
The Valentine commercial speech doctrine survived for thirty years until,
in 1975, it was reexamined in the context of abortion advertising in Bigelow
v. Virginia.3 2 In Bigelow, a newspaper published advertising which was paid
for by a New York agency that assisted women in arranging for low-cost
abortions in New York hospitals and clinics.3 3 The agency charged a fee for
the service. The state prosecuted the newspaper's editor for violating a state
statute that prohibited publication of material that encouraged abortion.34
The Court reversed the conviction and held that it was an error to assume
27. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
28. Id. at 54. The commercial speech doctrine was based on the rationale that speech
which existed only to serve the economic interests of the speaker deserved no first amendment
protection and thus was subject to regulation, while speech concerning opinion, politics, or
social information was fully protected and could not be restricted by the government. See J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSrrrUTIONAL LAW 923-43 (2d ed. 1983) (Chrestensen
generally interpreted as excluding all commercial speech from first amendment protection);
Note, Developments in the Law: Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAsv. L. Rv. 1005, 1027 (1967)
("[S]ince Chrestensen, the notion that commercial advertising is not protected by the first
amendment has been enshrined among the commonplaces of constitutional law.").
29. 316 U.S. at 53. The sanitary code provided that "no person shall . .. distribute ...
any handbills ... or other advertising matter ... in . . . any ... public place .... Id. at
53 n.l.
30. Id. at 54.
31. Note, Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation: The Revised Tennessee Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 51 TENN. L. REv. 853 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Lawyer Advertising]. See
generally Note, Fair Use and the First Amendment Protect Commercial Advertising: Consumer's
Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 17 CoNN. L. Rv. 835 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Fair Use] (commercial speech treated from 1945 to 1975 as expression relating to property
rights and regulated as economic activity); Thompson, supra note 7, at 967 (Chrestensen Court's
emphasis on economic motivation for commercial speech too broad to be helpful).
32. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
33. The advertisement read in part: "Abortions are now legal in New York. There are
no residency requirements. For immediate placement ... [clontact Women's Pavilion ... We
will make all arrangements for you and help you with information and counseling." 421 U.S.
at 812.
34. Id. at 812-13. The statute that was violated read in part "If any person, by publication
... advertisement ... or in any other manner, encourages ... the procuring of an abortion
... he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960).
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that advertising was not entitled to first amendment protection simply because
it was commercial in nature." The Court declined, however, to determine
to what extent commercial speech was protected. 6 The Court instead em-
ployed a balancing test that weighed the first amendment issue against the
particular public interest involved.3 7 Because the advertisement contained
information about abortion, the scales tipped in favor of granting some first
amendment protection since the advertisement involved a particularly strong
constitutionally protected public interest, one far more important than simply
the commercial nature of the advertising.3"
During the next term, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Counsel, 3 9 the Court strengthened the protection given to commercial
speech by holding that the rights of consumers to receive information, and
of advertisers to disseminate it,40 were interests which deserved protection.4 1
Thus, speech which did "no more than propose a commercial transaction"
would be protected under the first amendment.4 2 The commercial transaction
in Virginia Pharmacy involved advertised prescription drug prices by licensed
pharmacists, a practice characterized as unprofessional conduct by a Virginia
statute.43 The state apparently feared that price advertising would lead con-
sumers to put disproportionate emphasis on price over quality. Rejecting the
state's paternalistic approach, the Court found that the public's interest in
35. 421 U.S. at 825. Relying on its prior decisions, the Court held that the commercial
form of speech does not deprive it of first amendment protection. Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh
Press, 413 U.S. at 384; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266).
36. 421 U.S. at 825.
37. Id. at 826. The Court struck down the Virginia statute because it regulated speech
that was not deceptive, fraudulent, in furtherance of a criminal act, or an invasion of privacy.
Id. at 828.
38. The Court specifically noted that the public had an interest in obtaining information
about abortion services in New York, and that the right to an abortion was constitutionally
protected. Id. at 822. See generally Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, 85 Ill. App.
3d 311, 407 N.E.2d 71 (1980) (commercial advertising on home childbirth involves constitutional
right that degerves as much protection as abortion advertising in Bigelow); Note, Lawyer
Advertising, supra note 31, at 859 (status of abortion as constitutionally protected right heavily
influenced the Court's decision); Moore, supra note 4, at 32 (nature of the Bigelow speech,
which was viewed as more than commercial speech, compelled its protection; Bigelow did not
abrogate Chrestensen, or establish a broad principle of commercial speech protection); Note,
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Commercial Speech-Lawyer Advertising Protected by
the First Amendment, 11 CREIOHTON L. REv. 577, 584-85 (1977) (Bigelow presented public
interest other than commercial nature of advertising).
39. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
40. Id. at 762-63.
41. Id. at 757.
42. Id. at 762. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 654 (1978)
(Justice Blackmun's opinion in Virginia Pharmacy was "powerful," and the result was a
"landmark holding"); Thompson, supra note 7, at 968 (Virginia Pharmacy was single most
important commercial speech decision).
43. The statute stated: "Any pharmacist shall be ... guilty of unprofessional conduct
who . . . advertises ... price ... for any drugs ... dispensed only by prescription." 425 U.S.
at 750 n.2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974)).
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the free flow of commercial information outweighed the state's asserted
interest in maintaining high standards of professionalism among pharma-
cists." The Court held that the state may not completely suppress the
dissemination of truthful information about a lawful activity based solely
upon fear of the effect of the information upon either the disseminators or
recipients .41
The Virginia Pharmacy Court articulated two reasons for distinguishing
between commercial speech and other types of speech for purposes of first
amendment protection. First, the disseminator of commercial speech can
easily establish its truth or correctness. Second, since communication is a
key element of selling, there is little risk that it will be suppressed completely
by appropriate regulation in a free market system. These two characteristics
of commercial speech justified its regulation to prevent deception."
The Virginia Pharmacy Court's consumer benefit rationale for the con-
stitutional protection of commercial speech formed the basis of several later
decisions. In 1977, the Court in Bates v. State Bar Association of Arizona 7
held that truthful advertising regarding the availability and terms of routine
legal services could not be restrained,48 and recognized the right of consumers
to be informed about the activities of the legal profession. 49 Arizona's ban
on lawyer advertising was struck down and the Court rebutted every justi-
44. 425 U.S. at 770. The Court concluded that Virginia's close regulation of pharmacists
ensured high professional standards without the advertising ban, and that the ban had no direct
effect on professional standards. Id. at 768-69. See generally Note, Fair Use, supra note 31, at
837 (Virginia Pharmacy established new category of first amendment protection based on public
interest: commercial free speech).
45. 425 U.S. at 773. The Court found that in addition to serving the interests of "speaker
and listener," this type of speech served society's interests by promoting the welfare of those
who are most dependent on prescription medicine. It noted that for certain types of consumers,
prescription drug price information "could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the
enjoyment of basic necessities." Id. at 763-64. See also Thompson, supra note 7, at 968 (price
advertising served disabled and elderly who are most dependent on prescription medicine).
Issues were left unresolved that dealt with restrictions or commercial advertising related to
illegal activity, and on advertising by other professions, such as lawyers or physicians. 425 U.S.
at 771-73.
46. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. See generally Note, First Amendment Protection of Commercial
Speech, 32 U. KAN. L. Rxv. 679, 684 (1984) [hereinafter Note, First Amendment Protection]
(greater objectivity and durability of commercial speech increases propriety of regulating
commercial speech to prevent deception). Cf. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment
Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372, 385-86 (1979) (commercial speech may be less verifiable than
other types and political speech may be more verifiable).
47. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
48. Id. at 384.
49. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 402, 555 P.2d 640, 648 (1976) (Holohan, J., dissenting).
See generally Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L.
REv. 1 (1976) (consumer protection rationale is an important one for constitutional protection
of commercial speech); Note, The Status of Lawyer Advertising in Virginia: What is Good
Taste?, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 629, 630 (1985) (Bates outcome predictable in light of Virginia
Pharmacy).
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fication that the Arizona Bar Association offered in support of the ban.50
As with commercial or noncommercial speech, the advertising was subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations that properly advanced
legitimate state interests."
In 1980, a specific framework emerged for measuring the constitutionality
of commercial speech restrictions. In Central Hudson Gas and Electric v.
Public Service Commission1 2 a regulation, enacted during the energy crisis
and banning utility companies from encouraging the use of energy through
promotional advertising, was held unconstitutional. The Court found that
since the first amendment's concern for commercial speech was based on
the informational function of advertising, 3 the consumer's need for infor-
mation which might aid in purchasing decisions was worthy of protection.5 4
Instead of using Virginia Pharmacy's definition of commercial speech as
50. 433 U.S. at 368-79. To the ABA's primary assertion that advertising would adversely
affect the dignity of the legal profession, the Court responded that there was not a sufficient
connection between advertising and "the erosion of true professionalism," especially since the
public was already aware that attorneys are motivated by a profit interest. The ABA's second
justification for banning attorney advertising was that it is inherently misleading due to the
lack of a standardized product. Acknowledging that legal advertising could not provide totally
complete information to the reader, the Court nevertheless concluded that some information
was better than none.
The Court dismissed as irrelevant the ABA's third contention that advertising would stir
up litigation, adding that the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility placed an affirmative duty on attorneys to make legal services available to the public.
The Court found "unlikely" the Bar Association's assertion that the increased costs of adver-
tising would result in higher fees to the client. Finally, the ABA argued that the potential for
deceptive advertising mandated the creation of a regulatory agency, posing an undue burden
on the profession. The Court countered by crediting the majority of attorneys with honesty in
their methods of dealing with the public, and expressed confidence that the advertising standards
would be self-enforced. Id.
51. 433 U.S. at 384. Reasonable regulations on time, place, or manner of speech are
upheld if the regulations are content-neutral and do not entirely eliminate the opportunity for
speech. For example, in Ohralik, the Supreme Court upheld a restriction on in-person solicitation
by attorneys as a valid regulation on the manner of commercial speech based on ethical
considerations. 436 U.S. at 466-67. See also Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 535 (suppression
of billing inserts discussing public policy issues unconstitutional because regulation foreclosed
an adequate alternative communication channel); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1977) (first amendment is not violated by conviction for draft card burning); Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (regulations regarding picketing near public schools unacceptable
when defined in terms of subject matter). Additionally, time, place, or manner restrictions must
pass the "least restrictive alternative" test. See Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637 (door-
to-door solicitation regulations acceptable); Linmark Ass'n v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93
(1977) (prohibition on use of "for sale" signs unacceptable because seller had no alternative
hannel of communication). See also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 (Court expressly upheld
validity of regulations regarding time, place, and manner of advertising as long as they are
justified without reference to the content of the speech, they serve a "significant" government
interest, and alternative communication channels remain open).
52. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
53. Id. at 563.
54. Id. at 567.
[Vol. 36:583
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that which "merely proposes a commercial transaction,"" the Court defined
commercial speech as that relating solely to the economic interests of speaker
and audience. 6 The Court then formulated a four-part test for evaluating
restrictions on commercial speech.57 Under the first prong of the test, as
long as the communication is not false, misleading, or deceptive, it is
constitutionally protected." Thereafter, only narrowly drawn restrictions that
directly advance a substantial state interest are allowed.19
The Court applied the Central Hudson test to strike down a postal
regulation which prohibited the unsolicited mailing of contraceptive adver-
tising in Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corporation.60 The defendant, a
contraceptives manufacturer, promoted his products to wholesalers through
direct mail. Despite the fact that at least one of the mailings was primarily
an informational pamphlet on the prevention of venereal disease, with only
one small reference to Young's products, 6 the Court found that most of the
mailings fell "within the core notion of commercial speech ' 62 as defined by
Virginia Pharmacy.63 The Court concluded that the three mailings involved
were all varieties of commercial speech. 64 Under the Central Hudson test,
the Court found the postal regulation to be more extensive than necessary
to serve the state's interest in shielding recipients from mail that they were
likely to find offensive. 61
In concluding that the mailings were commercial speech, the Court ad-
dressed the fact that the mailings were not all merely proposals for com-
mercial transactions. 6 Taken individually, the references to specific products,
55. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
56. 447 U.S. at 561.
57. Id. at 566. The test considers (1) whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is
not misleading; (2) whether there is a substantial state interest in the regulation; (3) whether
the regulation directly promotes that interest; and (4) whether the regulation is only as extensive
as necessary to serve that interest. Id.
58. Id.
59. 447 U.S. at 564, 569-70. In Central Hudson, the state failed to show that its interests
could not be served by a more narrowly drawn restriction. Id. at 570. See also In re R.M.J.,
445 U.S. 191 (1982) (inherently misleading attorney advertising can be regulated by states);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (ordinance banning commercial
billboards was sufficiently narrow in scope and directly advanced the state's interests); Friedman
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (optometrists use of trade names can be regulated to promote
state's interest in preventing deception). See generally Note, First Amendment Protection, supra
note 46, at 694 (under the Central Hudson test, it is extremely difficult to predict how a court
will treat a specific restriction).
60. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
61. Id. at 66 n.13. See also Note, First Amendment Protection, supra note 46, at 695
(pamphlet entitled "Plain Talk about Venereal Disease" considered informational and of public
interest).
62. 463 U.S. at 66.
63. Id. (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (commercial speech defined as doing
does no more than proposing a commercial transaction)).
64. Id. at 66-67.
65. Id. at 71.
66. Id. at 66.
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the defendant's economic motive, and the form of the mailings as adver-
tisements were not enough to classify the mailings as commercial speech. 67
Even though the material included a discussion of venereal disease and birth
control that was not specifically related to selling the product, 6  the cumu-
lative effect of these factors was sufficient to justify a commercial speech
characterization. 
69
The Court reached a similar result in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel. 70 The Court ruled that even though advertising by the attorney
contained information of public interest regarding the legal rights of persons
injured by an intrauterine device, it was commercial speech .7 The advertise-
ment, featuring a picture of the Dalkon Shield, asked "Did you use this
I.U.D.?" and invited readers to call the attorney if they had. 72 The Court
noted that all advertising was implicitly a plea for patronage, 73 and that the
commercial speech doctrine rests heavily on the "common sense" distinction
between speech which proposes a commercial transaction and other varieties
of speech. 74 After defining the advertising as commercial, the Court applied
the Central Hudson test and held that Ohio could not prohibit its attorneys
from using truthful advertising. 71
While the Central Hudson test for evaluation of the constitutionality of
regulations on speech appears to be on firm ground, 76 the current law on
the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech continues to
present a quandary. Clarifying the distinction has proven fruitless and in-
conclusive. 77 Singularly decisive characteristics of commercial speech have
67. Id.
68. Id. at 68. See also Note, First Amendment Protection, supra note 46, at 695 (Court
missed an opportunity to clarify distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech by
focusing on distinctions among several mailings); Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 1258 (combination
of product reference and economic motive supports conclusion that information pamphlets were
commercial speech).
69. 463 U.S. at 67.
70. 471 U.S. 626 (1984).
71. Id. at 638.
72. Id. at 630-31. See Stewart, A Picture Costs Ten Thousand Words, 71 A.B.A. J. 62-
63 (Jan. 1985).
73. 471 U.S. at 639.
74. Id. at 637.
75. Id. at 646-47.
76. Most recently, the Central Hudson analysis has been applied to hold that states may
sometimes ban nondeceptive advertising for legal products and services. See Posadas de Puerto
Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1987) (state may prohibit advertising
by gambling casinos directed at residents of the state).
77. The ambiguity surrounding the term "commercial speech" has troubled scholars and
commentators for years. Farber, supra note 46, at 386-90; Redish, The First Amendment in
the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39'GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 429, 430-31 (1971); Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
U. ILL. L.F. 1080, 1088-90 (1976). Demonstrating the problem in applying the various com-
mercial speech definitions to a particular type of speech, one commentator cites several examples
of speech that do not propose a commercial transaction under Virginia Pharmacy, but could
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included speech for "private profit."18 In contrast, the Bigelow Court ex-
plicitly held that the speaker's economic motive did not make speech com-
mercial. 79 Virginia Pharmacy broadly characterized commercial speech as
that which "does no more than propose a commercial transaction." ' 0 The
Central Hudson Court altered this definition by classifying commercial speech
as relating "solely to the economic interests" of the speaker and the audi-
ence. "' This definition was echoed in Bolger, which added that reference to
specific products, and speech which took the form of an advertisement, were
not sufficient, on their own, to justify classifying speech as commercial. 2
According to Zauderer, "common sense" tells us that all advertising is
commercial because all advertising is implicitly a plea for patronage. 3 How-
ever, those who recognize the potential for commercial speech to simulta-
neously communicate economic and political or social messages would balk
at Zauderer's oversimplified and highly generalized "common sense" ap-
proach.
The Court's consistent failure to establish clear, workable guidelines to
determine what makes speech commercial is not surprising given the intan-
gible and multi-faceted nature of communication. As demonstrated by the
plethora of standards already available, 4 a single rule that has application
beyond the immediate fact situation is simply too difficult to fashion. As a
relate solely to the economic interests of the speaker and audience under Central Hudson. These
include corporations speaking to the press about their corporate future, to their shareholders
about their interests in the company, to their employees subject to labor laws, and to government
officials regarding lobbying efforts. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 1214-15. Shiffrin notes that the
commercial speech cases are unclear on whether the focus should be on the message, the motives
of the speaker and the audience, or something else. Id. at 1222. Even the Supreme Court has
cited examples of commercial speech that may be of general or public interest, such as when
an artificial fur manufacturer promotes its product as an alternative to the extinction of fur
bearing animals, or a domestic producer advertises its product as an alternative to imports.
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764. See also Note, Fair Use, supra note 31, at 838 (Supreme
Court decisions fail to establish guidelines that lower courts can use to determine when social
value of commercial speech will entitle it to full protection); Note, First Amendment Protection,
supra note 46, at 685 (major problem with development of commercial speech doctrine is that
Court never defined commercial speech). But see Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1979) (commercial
speech should not be protected at all because it is "business advertising which does no more
than solicit a business transaction or state information relevant thereto"); Baker, supra note
49, at 13-25 (first amendment only protects speech resulting from voluntary decision making,
not forced decisions coerced by profit motive).
78. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
79. 421 U.S. at 818.
80. 425 U.S. at 762.
81. 447 U.S. at 561.
82. 463 U.S. at 66.
83. 471 U.S. at 639.
84. See Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 1255 (nature of speech, with its various and complex
interaction of important values, justifies alternatives that treat it in concrete contexts-general
abstractions do not work).
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result, the effective and efficient regulation of deceptive speech is sometimes
hampered.
B. Deception
Under common law, limited protection against false and deceptive adver-
tising is available in the form of a claim which includes fraud and warranty
actions8 5 In cases involving interstate commerce, a cause of action arises
under either section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 6 or section 5(a)(l) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.8 7 Both sections attack advertising that has
the capacity or tendency to deceive the consumer."8 Generally, the Lanham
Act is a private remedial scheme for the benefit of competitors, while the
FTC Act more specifically serves the public interest.8 9 In addition to these
federal statutes, most states have enacted similar laws to prevent false,
deceptive, or misleading advertising.90 These state statutes generally defer to
FTC and federal court interpretations of section 5(a) of the FTC Act for
definitions of deceptive conduct. 9
In 1983, the FTC issued a policy enforcement statement defining deception
as a "representation, omission, or other practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detri-
ment." 92 In In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc.,93 the FTC used this new definition
to find that advertising for an automotive air-bleed device, designed to save
85. Thompson, supra note 7, at 973 n.193. Common law actions for fraud, deceit, and
warranty were limited to providing relief on a case-by-case basis. Injunctions were not available
to prevent further dissemination of the advertising. E. KINTER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF
DEcEPTIVE PRACTICES: A GUIDE FOR THE BUSINESSMAN 7-8 (1971).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) states in part:
Any person who shall ... use in connection with any goods.., any false description
or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or
represent the same, and shall cause such goods . .. to enter into commerce, . . .
shall be liable to a civil action . . . by any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982) ("unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful").
88. FTC v. Brown and Williamson Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
89. Id.
90. Thompson, supra note 7, at 968. For example, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Practices Act provides the statutory basis for advertising within the state of Illinois.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, paras. 261-317 (1983).
91. Karns, Advertising Regulation in Illinois: Should the FTC Be Ignored?, 74 ILL. B.J.
386 (1986).
92. Letter from Chairman James C. Miller III to Hon. John D. Dingell at 4 (Oct. 14,
1983) [hereinafter Letter, Deception Policy Statement] (discussing FTC Deception Policy En-
forcement Statement). The FTC defines misrepresentation as "an express or implied statement
contrary to fact." A misleading omission occurs when the "qualifying information necessary
to prevent a practice, claim, representation, or reasonable belief from being misleading is not
disclosed." In determining whether an omission is deceptive, the overall impression created by
the representation, practice, or claim is examined. Id. at 2 n.4.
93. 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
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fuel, was deceptive because it claimed that "every car needs one" when in
fact cars manufactured after 1974 could not benefit from the product.
Furthermore, claims of enhanced fuel efficiency were overstated.9 Applying
this standard in Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC,95 the court found that
brochures promoting land investment were deceptive because they failed to
disclose material information regarding both the suitability of the property
for various uses and the financial risk involved.91
Proof of actual consumer deception is not necessary to enjoin advertising.
Rather, the FTC and state agencies may properly regulate speech that presents
a likelihood of deception.9 7 According to the court in Thompson Medical
Company, Inc. v. FTC,9s whether or not a particular advertisement is likely
to deceive is "determined by the net impression it is likely to make upon
the viewing public." Thus, advertising that conveys a false or misleading
impression about a product or service is improper even if each individual
statement in the ad, considered separately, is literally and technically true.9
Additionally, advertising that may be "reasonably" interpreted in a mis-
leading way is unlawful even though other nonmisleading interpretations are
possible.' °°
For example, in Thompson Medical Co., '0 the company manufactured
Aspercreme, a nonaspirin product developed to relieve arthritic pain. A
94. Id. at 167.
95. 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986).
96. Id. at 1435. See also supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. The use of a "technical
term" in Zauderer was enough to prompt the Court to find "self-evident" deception. The
technical term was the word "fees" as contrasted with "costs." In the context of attorney
advertising, the former was a word of art, according to the Court. The deception resulted from
the reference in the advertising to the availability of contingent fee arrangements without
disclosing that the client was liable for costs associated with the litigation.
97. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 15; American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687
(3d Cir. 1982); Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979). See
also Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976) (likelihood of deception is
criterion by which advertising is measured); Letter, Deception Policy Statement, supra note 92,
at 4 (issue is whether act or practice is likely to mislead, rather than if it causes actual deception).
98. 791 F.2d 189, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also American Home Prods., 695 F.2d at
685 (important consideration is net impression conveyed to the public); Warner Lambert Co.
v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (close proximity of statements in advertisement deceptively
conveyed that killing germs meant curing colds); FTC v. Sterling Drugs, 317 F.2d 669, 674
(2nd Cir. 1963) (in reviewing advertising, Commission will examine "the entire mosaic, rather
than each tile separately").
99. Thompson Medical Co., 791 F.2d at 197; Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523,
528 (5th Cir. 1963). See also Letter, Deception Policy Statement supra note 92 (entire adver-
tisement transaction, or cause of dealing will be considered).
100. 791 F.2d at 197; National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 161 n.4
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Jay Norris Corp. v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th
Cir. 1977); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982) (secondary deceptive message is actionable
even though primary message accurate); Letter, Deception Policy Statement supra note 92, at
8 (when representation conveys even one meaning to reasonable consumers which is false, seller
is liable).
101. 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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television advertisement featured an announcer who held two aspirin tablets
and stated, "Aspercreme starts concentrating all the temporary relief of two
aspirin directly at the point of minor arthritic pain . . . . " As she spoke,
the aspirin tablets she held were replaced by a tube of Aspercreme.10 2 On
review, the appellate court affirmed the FTC's finding that Thompson's
advertising falsely represented that its nonaspirin product contained aspirin,
and that this was a material misrepresentation likely to mislead customers. 03
The FTC enjoined the advertising, even though none of the advertising at
issue explicitly stated that Aspercreme contained aspirin, because the overall
net impression was that it did.1°4
A 1982 Lanham Act case, Better Business Bureau v. Medical Directors, 0
suggested that the context of an ad might deceive consumers even though
the advertisement was entirely true on its face.1° The defendant, a weight
clinic, ran advertising that referred to customers who had provided generally
favorable reports on the clinic to the Better Business Bureau as Better
Business Bureau "investigators." The court enjoined the advertising and
held that, when it was considered in the context of the Bureau's traditional
role in "encouraging, honesty and exposing deception," this advertising
deceptively inferred that the defendant had the Bureau's endorsement, even
though the advertisement was technically accurate.'07
A recent example of the difference between deception "on its face" and
deception "in effect" is the Ninth Circuit's holding that the expenditure of
"substantial funds" on the publication of false claims created a rebuttable
presumption of actual deception and reliance. In U-Haul International v.
Jartran, Inc., 0o the defendant engaged in an eighteen-month national ad-
vertising campaign which compared its capabilities to those of its primary
competitor, U-Haul. Observing the difficulty of establishing consumer de-
ception through direct evidence, the court held that Jartran's substantial
spending, in an effort to deceptively influence consumers' purchasing deci-
sions, justified the existence of a presumption that consumers were de-
ceived.1'° Although the issue raised on this particular appeal was a $40
102. Id. at 191.
103. Id. at 190, 197.
104. Id. at 197. The Commission added that the deception had been deliberate on
Thompson's part, although it refrained from commenting on the significance of intent to a
finding of deception. Id. at 191. Earlier cases have held that the advertiser's intent may be
considered when construing the meaning of the particular advertisement. See Plough, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods., 532 F. Supp. 714, 717-18 (D. Del. 1982) (meaning of the
word "sunscreen" determined in light of defendant's intent and context); American Home
Prods. Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 522 F. Supp. 1035, 1040-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (literal
meaning of advertising must be determined in light of intent and content).
105. 681 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1982).
106. Id. at 403.
107. Id.
108. 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
109. Id. at 1041.
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million damage award and not the initial finding of deceptiveness, the holding
demonstrates the willingness of the courts and the FTC to consider a varied
range of factors when evaluating the likelihood that advertising will deceive
or mislead consumers.
In reviewing advertising, the FTC may rely on its own expertise and
judgment without the aid of consumer surveys, testimony, or other evidence
of actual deception.110 The court in FTC v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,'" emphasizing that the "public's impression is the only true measure
of deceptiveness, '"112 noted that having some empirical evidence of public
impression would generally be desirable, but not necessary to support a
finding of tendency to deceive."'
Somewhat offsetting the seemingly broad standards employed to measure
deceptiveness and the flexibility the courts and the commission enjoy in
applying them, is the requirement that advertising be interpreted in its entirety
and in terms of the audience it speaks to. The Second Circuit in Avis Rent
A Car System, Inc. v. Hertz Corp.," 4 quoted Judge Learned Hand's warning
that "[t]here is no surer way to misread any document than to read it
literally.""' In March 1984, Hertz ran an advertisement with the headline
"Hertz has more new cars than Avis has cars." 6 Avis sued in U.S. district
court under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act claiming that the statement
was absolutely false." 7 Avis argued that because the advertisement was not
110. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965); Thompson Medical Co.,
791 F.2d at 197; Brown and Williamson, 778 F.2d at 40; Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 738 F.2d
554, 563 (1984). See also American Home Prods., 695 F.2d at 687-88 n. 10 (consumer testimony,
although helpful, not essential); Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. MacKenzie v. United States, 423 U.S. 827 (1975) (commission
could have reached conclusions regarding deceptive nature of ads without consumer witnesses);
J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967) (commission need not take random
sample to determine meaning and impact of ads); Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523,
528 (5th Cir. 1963) (FTC may draw its own inferences and need not rely on testimony or
exhibits); Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 917 (1962) (commission needs no consumer testimony to support inference of deceptive-
ness); Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1944) (commission not required
to sample public opinion). But see Leonard Porter Co. v. FTC, 88 F.T.C. 546, 626 n.5 (1976)
(in some cases may require extrinsic evidence to prove likelihood of deception).
111. 778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
112. Id. at 39-40.
113. Id. at 40. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text. Evaluating advertising's
tendency to deceive is not always easy. See Kramer, Marconian Problems, Gutenbergian
Remedies: Evaluating the Multiple-Sensory Experience Ad on the Double-Spaced, Typewritten
Page, 36 FED. Comm. L. SERV. 35, 36 (1977) (serious problems arise when regulators evaluate
possible falsity or deception without considering ad in same context it sought to instill); Gellhorn,
Proof of Consumer Deception Before the FTC, 17 U. KAN. L. Rv. 559, 563-67 (1969) (FTC
does not have sufficient expertise to know how consumers interpret ads; ads are often ambiguous,
and workable measure of consumer understanding is elusive).
114. 782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1986).
115. Id. at 385 (quoting Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944)).
116. 782 F.2d at 383.
117. Id. at 381.
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specifically limited to rental cars, it was false since Avis owned more cars
than Hertz at the time the claim was made. Hertz defended on the ground
that the advertising, properly construed, referred only to the cars available
for rental by the two companies, not to the total number of cars owned. " 8
The trial court rejected Hertz's argument that consumers would interpret the
advertisement as a comparison of rental fleets as opposed to all cars owned.'I 9
The appellate court overturned the holding and reasoned that in determining
its meaning, an advertisement must be considered in its entirety. The court
determined that isolated statements could not be interpreted out of context.
The court stated that the advertisement must be read in the context of the
target consumer's actual concerns and interests. 20 Because Hertz addressed
the advertisement to the "renting public," it successfully argued that the
advertisement was not deceptive since consumers of rental cars would un-
derstand that the advertisements referred only to cars for rent.' 2' Thus, an
advertiser is not liable for every possible interpretation or action by a
consumer. Instead, the test is whether the consumer's interpretation or
reaction to the communication as a whole is reasonable.122 When advertising
is targeted to a specific audience, it is evaluated in terms of its effect on a
reasonable or ordinary member of the targeted group. 23
Once it is determined that a representation, omission, or practice is likely
to mislead consumers, it must be "material" to be judged deceptive.'24
Materiality does not depend on a showing of actual injury, 25 but instead,
118. Id. at 383.
119. Id. at 382-83.
120. Id. at 385.
121. Id. at 386. The Court added that Avis failed to introduce any evidence regarding the
message received by the audience to whom the advertising was directed. Context and entirety
can not be ignored as emphasized in earlier cases. See Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol Meyers
Co., 661 F.2d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1981) (court cannot engage in "disputatious dissection");
Sterling Drug, 317 F.2d at 674 (principles of interpretation include analysis of communication
in its entirety).
122. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. at 165; National Dynamics v. FTC, 492 F.2d
1333 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Warner Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(claim evaluated from perspective of "average listener"); Letter, Deception Policy Statement
supra note 92, at 8-9 (practice must be considered from perspective of reasonable consumer).
123. Hertz, 782 F.2d at 385; Porter v. Dietsche, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979); Horizon
Corp. v. FTC, 97 F.T.C. 464, 810 n.13 (1981). See also Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 n.37 (consideration
of legal sophistication of audience necessary in determination of whether attorney advertising
is. misleading); Travel King, Inc. v. FTC, 86 F.T.C. 715, 757, 759-60 (1975) (seriously ill
consumers particularly vulnerable to exaggerated medical claims); Ideal Toy Co. v. FTC, 64
F.T.C. 297, 310 (1964) (children as consumer group not equipped to evaluate possibility that
claims aimed at them may be untrue); Westen, Remarks of Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of
Consumer Protection, "New Directions in the Regulation of Advertising: Protecting Children
in the Marketplace of Ideas," (Mar. 1978) (television advertising has tremendous impact on
children, yet they lack ability of adults to comprehend it).
124. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
125. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 391-92; Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579
F.2d 1137, 1168 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Resort Car Rental System, 518 F.2d at 964 (actual
damage need not be shown).
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is based on the influence the representation has on consumer behavior. A
claim or representation is material if it is likely to affect a consumer's
product choice, or his conduct regarding a product.2 6 Under this standard,
"injury exists if consumers would have chosen differently but for the de-
ception." '27 Further, representations or omissions that significantly involve
subject matter with which the reasonable consumer would be concerned,
such as health, safety, or cost, are also considered material.1 21
In sum, "deception" is a subjective standard that protects both the
advertiser and the consumer. The advertiser's protection comes from the
assurance that its advertising will be evaluated, not in isolation or piece by
piece, but as a total communication. The advertisement is interpreted, there-
fore, as its intended target audience would interpret it. Similarly, the con-
sumer is protected by application of a standard that considers the unique
experience, knowledge, and circumstances that the targeted market draws
upon when responding to advertising, along with the net impression likely
from a particular advertisement. Each advertisement should be judged in
terms of the influence such information has on a prospective consumer's
choice of product or service. Thus, the advertising must be viewed from the
perspective of the audience, an audience which acts "reasonably under the
circumstances." 1 29
II. FAaoo WoMEN's HEALTH ORoANZATrON V. LARsoN
The plaintiff, Fargo Women's Health Organization, was a medical clinic
that performed abortions. The defendant, The Women's Help Clinic, pro-
vided pregnancy tests and anti-abortion counseling services, but did not
perform abortions. The Women's Health Organization filed an action for
damages and injunctive relief charging that the Help Clinic used false and
deceptive advertising to mislead women into believing that they performed
126. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 386; Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 112;
American Home Prods., 695 F.2d at 690. See also Basis of Statement and Purpose of the
Cigarette Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8386-87 (1964) (deception material if it is likely to affect
average consumer in deciding whether to buy advertised product); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 538(2) (1977) (material misrepresentation or omission is one which reasonable person
would regard important in knowing how to act).
127. Letter, Deception Policy Statement supra note 92. But see Cliffdale Assocs., 103
F.T.C. 110, 196 (Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Opinion and Policy Statement conclusions that injury and materiality are synonymous, that
causation and reliance must be shown or even that the likelihood of consumer detriment must
be demonstrated in every case do not square with these accepted standards of materiality.").
128. Letter, Deception Policy Statement supra note 92. See Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C.
at 116 (scientific support for product performance claims is material); Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1073) (misrepresentation as to safety involves issue .of
great significance to consumers); J.B. Williams Co., 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (information
that product works in only small number of cases where symptoms are due to iron deficiency
is material).
129. Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 165.
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abortions in order to lure them to the Help Clinic to discuss anti-abortion
alternatives. The Women's Health Organization also charged that the defen-
dant intentionally named itself the "Help Clinic" to cause confusion, and
lead women who wanted to contact the Women's Health Organization into
unknowingly contacting the Help Clinic. 30
The Help Clinic advertised in newspapers and the telephone book. The
advertisements featured the word "abortion" in large, bold type followed
by a listing of services. The list included "financial assistance," "advisory
services," "free pregnancy tests," "services performed by licensed physi-
cians," "confidential," and in one of the two advertisements, "indecision
counseling-Pro-Life.' 131
The trial court entered a preliminary injunction following a hearing. Prior
to granting the injunction, the court found that the plaintiff Health Clinic
had made a prima facie showing that the Help Clinic's advertising was false
and deceptive and would injure the plaintiff if allowed to continue during
litigation.' The court enjoined the Help Clinic from using its name or a
similar one, deceptively advertising the availability of elective abortions,
deluding women into believing they were seeking assistance from the Wom-
en's Health Clinic when in fact they were not, and using the word "abortion"
in its advertising unless it explicitly stated that it did not perform abortions.' 3
The Help Clinic appealed, asserting that the preliminary injunction in-
fringed on its first amendment rights. 134 Before reviewing the injunction, the
North Dakota Supreme Court briefly summarized the current law regarding
prior restraint of speech, and cited Zauderer and Central Hudson for the
proposition that commercial speech does not receive the full panoply of first
amendment protection. 3 Relying on Virginia Pharmacy, it added that prior
restraint of commercial speech was allowed, although to what extent re-
mained unclear. 36 The court then framed the issue as "whether the Help
Clinic's communication constituted commercial or noncommercial speech.' 37
The court first determined that commercial speech was involved in this
case.'38 It began its analysis of the issue by quoting the Zauderer Court's
130. Approximately 2,000 pro-life centers have opened since the 1973 Roe v. Wade
decision. These centers have made it their goal to combat abortion clinics by deflecting potential
clinic customers to the centers. See Law, Pro-Life Clinics Suffer Legal Attack, INsIoT, Oct.
27, 1986, at 52-54.
131. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 178 n.1 (N.D. 1986).
132. Id. at 179.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 180. The Help Clinic also questioned whether the state's false advertising laws
applied to this case, and whether the Women's Health Organization had a valid cause of action
for trademark infringement. Id. at 177-78. Because it was reviewing only the propriety of the
preliminary injunction, the supreme court refused to rule on these two issues, as they involved
the merits of the case. Id. at 183.
135. Id. at 180.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 182.
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characterization of the commercial speech doctrine as based on the "common
sense distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction ...
and other varieties of speech .... "139 The court then arrived at its deter-
mination that the Help Clinic's advertising was commercial speech, as op-
posed to noncommercial advocacy advertising, based on three factors: (1)
the availability of financial assistance from the Help Clinic and its acceptance
of credit cards; (2) the commercial context of the advertising and its pro-
motion of services rather than ideas; and (3) the absence of any substantial
reference to, or comment upon, public issue matters.' 4° The court rejected
the defendant's argument that, because no monetary charges were assessed
for services rendered to patients, the communication was really advocacy
advertising in support of the pro-life position and not commercial speech.1 41
It then applied Central Hudson's four-part test to reach the conclusion that
the injunctive relief granted did not unconstitutionally infringe on the Help
Clinic's first amendment rights. 42 According to the court, the order was
narrowly drawn to proscribe only the deceptive and misleading advertising,
and did not prohibit the Help Clinic from rendering or advertising services
as long as they were not deceptive. 143 The court found a portion of the
injunction, which ordered the Help Clinic to explicitly state that it did not
perform abortions if it used the word "abortion" in future advertising,
unduly broad and redundant. In light of the other provisions of the injunc-
tion, the court agreed that this restriction was unnecessary to prevent false
and misleading advertising.'"
III. ANALYsis AND CiuncIsM
The Fargo decision may have had a very different result if the court had
used a different definition of commercial speech. 45 For example, if the court
found profit motive determinative of commercial speech, as did the Court
in Virginia Pharmacy,'"6 the Help Clinic might have prevailed by arguing
that its advertising was not aimed at making money, but instead at turning
abortion seekers into advocates of the Help Clinic's anti-abortion philosophy.
Because the potential exists for advertisers like the Help Clinic to escape
judicial or governmental scrutiny by advertising under the guise of a "public
issue" communication, 47 alternatives are needed to the typical or cursory
139. Id. at 180 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637).
140. 381 N.W.2d at 180-81.
141. Id. at 180.
142. Id. at 182.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 179.
145. Fargo defines the nature of the speech by the nature of its context. 381 N.W.2d at
181.
146. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
147. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (upholds
portion of ordinance totally banning commercial billboards to preserve aesthetics and traffic
safety, but striking down general ban on noncommercial billboards as impermissible restriction
on speech).
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commercial speech analysis performed in Fargo and similar cases.
The Fargo court applied three factors to its definition of commercial
speech, which is speech proposing a commercial transaction. 48 After briefly
discussing the first factor, financial assistance and credit card acceptance,
the court dismissed as nondispositive the issue of whether "any monies are
received by the Help Clinic from its clients" in deciding if the speech was
commercial. 49 The extension of financial assistance and credit, however,
could be strong evidence of the pecuniary motive present in any commercial
transaction. Aside from the observation that one patron was charged for
services received from the Help Clinic, there was no discussion of fees, profit
or economic motive, or any other commercial considerations. Indeed, the
court specifically stated that it did not matter whether any money was
exchanged for services. 50
It was important, however, that the advertising appeared in a "commercial
context" which focused on the medical, advisory, and financial services
available in an attempt to solicit patronage for the clinic. The court called
this a "classic example" of commercial speech. 5 ' But the clinic was not in
the business of selling medical or advisory services. The clinic admitted that
it had no profit motive and testified that fees were not charged for services.
The objective underlying the solicitation was not pecuniary gain, but instead
the promotion of the Clinic's pro-life philosophy.'52
In applying a "commercial context" standard to distinguish commercial
from noncommercial speech,'53 the Fargo court never defined "commercial
context." Was it dependent on the form of the communication, the media
it appeared in, or the language it employed? In the 1964 libel case New York
Times v. Sullivan, 's4 the fact that the speech at issue was cast in the form
of a paid political advertisement did not transform it into commercial
speech.'55 Instead, the content of the advertisement, not the context, was the
crucial factor in determining what degree of constitutional protection the
148. 381 N.W.2d at 180.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 181.
152. The Help Clinic might have argued that its advertising was simply a communication
of its willingness to "serve" the community, much like the direct mail solicitation upheld by
the Court as fully protected noncommercial speech in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In
that case, the solicitation was from an ACLU attorney. The letter advised the recipient, who
had been sterilized as a condition for receiving Medicaid, to sue the doctor who performed the
procedure, and that the ACLU would represent her at no cost. The Court pointed out that the
motive underlying the solicitation was not pecuniary gain, but the advancement of "political
and ideological goals" through associational activity protected by the first amendment. Id. at
416. Therefore, Primus held that a lawyer informing an individual of a willingness to advise
was considered not-for-profit "informational" advertising. Id. at 427.
153. 381 N.W.2d at 181.
154. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
155. Id. at 266.
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speech deserved. 56 The Fargo court made no attempt to reconcile its appli-
cation of a "commercial context" standard with the New York Times
holding, nor did it try to fit it into the framework of prior commercial
speech standards.
The court relied on Zauderer,57 Bolger,' and Bigelow59 to refute the
Help Clinic's argument that the first amendment fully protected the adver-
tising as a form of advocacy advertising. The Court stated that merely tying
a communication to a public issue will not transform commercial into
noncommercial speech. Yet it neglected to reconcile its conclusions with
several cases that suggest the opposite conclusion might be reached. As one
court stated, "[T]he capacity of commercial speech to communicate simul-
taneously political and social messages can be discerned by anyone who gives
second thought to ... an advertisement for commercial abortion services at
a family planning clinic.' 6 Conversely, noncommercial speech has the same
propensity to "communicate simultaneously" economic and commercial mes-
sages.
In Glover v. Cole,16' involving a state university's ban on soliciting sales
for a Socialist Worker's Party newspaper, the university president argued
that the sales activity did not enjoy full first amendment protection because
the activity was a purely commercial transaction. 62 Cautioning that there
was "no certain refuge in platitudes from the commercial speech cases," the
court stated that the fallacy in applying the commercial speech approach
was the "plastic distinction" between pure speech and commercial activity.
It argued that fund raising may be an integral part of political advocacy. 63
The Supreme Court stated in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village
of Schaumburg'6 that some kinds of solicitation do more than affect private
economic decisions, most notably charitable contribution solicitations such
as the door-to-door canvassing undertaken by the Citizens for a Better
Environment. Because this type of solicitation included the dissemination of
156. Id. The Court stated that the speech was not commercial in the Chrestensen "private
profit" sense because it "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances,
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern. That the Times was paid for
publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers
and books are sold." Id. See generally Thompson, supra note 7, at 967 (New York Times
stands for proposition that "public speech," even if commercial in nature, is fully protected);
Moore, supra note 4, at 30 (Court viewed New York Times as establishing that advertising
concerning opinions and matters of public concern is entitled to full constitutional protection).
157. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
160. United States S.W. Afr./Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708
F.2d 760, 769 (1984).
161. 762 F.2d. 1197 (1985).
162. Id. at 1200.
163. Id. at 1200-01.
164. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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views and ideas as opposed to merely providing information on the char-
acteristics and costs of goods and services, it was categorized as fully
protected, noncommercial speech165
Quoting from the majority opinion in Bolger, the Fargo court stated that
the rationale for the Supreme Court's holding was clear: "[A]dvertisers
should not be permitted to immunize false or misleading product information
from government regulation simply by including references to public is-
sues." 16 It added that the Help Clinic could advocate a social or political
issue outside of a "commercial context" if it wished to take advantage of
the full first amendment protection. The court's own motive and analysis
became apparent when it included the Bolger quote in its opinion. The court
knew that the Help Clinic's advertising was misleading, yet recognized that
it could not regulate it without first categorizing it as commercial speech.
Aware that support for the argument that the advertising was commercial
speech was weak, the court posited its argument in the negative, reasoning
that the speech was not noncommercial after a cursory application of case
law to the facts. It easily distinguished Bigelow by pointing out that there
was no restriction on factual material of public interest as in the Virginia
statute which prohibited publication of pro-abortion information. Fargo
merely involved the commercial solicitation of clientele. 167 The court's ap-
proach, however, ignores the obvious. The advertising at issue here was not
aimed at gaining new business in the commercial sense, but in the ideological
sense.
Nevertheless, the court's only alternative was to label the advertisement
as commercial in order to uphold the injunction. Had the misleading effects
of the advertising not been so blatant, or had the court been more sympathetic
to the pro-life argument, it could have found that the speech was noncom-
mercial given the lack of an economic motive and the simple advisory or
informational nature of the advertisement's content. Instead, the court could
have applied the In re Primus holding that solicitation, with the objective
of furthering the ideological goals of a nonprofit organization, is fully
protected, noncommercial speech.' 6" Either alternative would preclude judi-
cial scrutiny of the advertising.
An argument similar to that endorsed in Fargo failed in a 1985 California
case. In Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, Inc. v. Azusa, 169 a church
and its minister sued to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance that prohibited
fortune-telling for consideration. The city argued that the type of fortune-
telling the ordinance addressed was commercial speech because it was engaged
165. Id. at 632. See also Pennsylvania Pub. Interest v. York Township, 569 F. Supp. 1398
(M.D. Penn. 1983) (charitable appeals for funds enjoy preferred first amendment status over
commercial solicitation).
166. Fargo, 381 N.W.2d at 181 (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68).
167. Id. at 182.
168. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
169. 39 Cal. 3d 501, 703 P.2d 1119, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. 1985).
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in for profit and did not concern or affect the political process. Thus, it
should not be entitled to full constitutional protection. 170 Essentially, the
city's argument mirrored the Fargo court's rationale. The California Supreme
Court rejected it, finding that fortune-telling for consideration was noncom-
mercial speech. Applying the Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson defi-
nitions of commercial speech, the court found that fortune-telling went
beyond the mere proposal of a commercial transaction and involved the
passing of information and ideas. The court reasoned that this exchange was
completely unrelated to any fees the client paid to receive the communica-
tion.' 7' Refuting the city's contention that the speech should not be considered
political, the court reasoned that it was impossible to conclude that fortune-
tellers never impart political messages because such communication "con-
ceivably could contain the spark of a political flame. 17 2 Thus, the possibility
that fortune-telling might "fire the imagination and stimulate discussion of
the future" also weighed against the city's argument.'73
It is tempting to try to distinguish Spiritual Psychic Church by arguing
that Fargo deals with the advertising of the "act" while Spiritual Psychic
Church deals with the "act" itself. The California Supreme Court, however,
explicitly stated that its analysis applied to all of the related and unrelated
activities covered by the city ban on fortune-telling, including advertising. 174
Thus, when the weakness of the economic motive argument is combined
with the possibility that the information the Help Clinic imparted could be
characterized as in the public interest or a political issue, applying Spiritual
Psychic Church would yield a different finding in Fargo.
IV. ALTERNATWES
The Fargo decision illustrates that arbitrary classification of speech as
commercial or noncommercial, at least in cases where it is not obviously
one or the other, creates a roadblock to the regulation of deceptive adver-
tising. 175
In situations where speech is not clearly commercial or noncommercial,
three alternative approaches to the traditional classification schemes are
suggested. The first approach is to eliminate the requirement that the speech
at issue initially be labeled commercial or noncommercial, often an artificial
designation, and permit the reviewing court to immediately apply the Central
Hudson test to determine whether, and how, the speech should be regu-
170. Id. at 508-11, 703 P.2d at 1122-23, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 228-30.
171. Id. at 510-11, 703 P.2d at 1123, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30.
172. Id. at 512, 703 P.2d at 1124, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 506 n.1, 703 P.2d at 1120 n.1, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 227 n.l.
175. Recognizing that speech often contains commercial and noncommercial elements,
Justice Stevens stated in Bolger that "it may be more fruitful to focus on the nature of the
challenged regulation rather than the proper label for the communication." 463 U.S. at 82-83
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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lated.'7 The second approach consists of an assessment of the risks invplved
in the particular communication to determine whether or not it should be
regulated. The last alternative would be the establishment of a separate
standard of review for medical, personal, or professional services advertising.
Under the first alternative, the court would apply the Central Hudson test
when speech is not clearly commercial or noncommercial. If the court finds
the communication to be fraudulent or misleading under the current "likely
to deceive" standard of review,177 it can be regulated to the extent necessary
to serve a substantial state interest. This approach permits direct attack on
deceptive speech without the judicial gymnastics currently undertaken to first
classify it as commercial. In Fargo, the search for a rationale upon which
to base a finding that the advertising was commercial would be avoided,
and the risk that another court could easily reach the opposite result in
subsequent litigation would be minimized. This approach increases certainty
by putting advertisers on notice that if their communication is likely to
deceive the targeted audience, it will be regulated. Thus, the Help Clinic
would be less likely to take a chance on running deceptive advertising in the
hope that it could prevail on the advocacy advertising argument and thereby
escape regulation. The chief disadvantage of this approach is the potential
for an overly broad application to speech that truly is noncommercial and
entitled to full first amendment protection. Under this approach, there is
still the need for judicial discretion to first determine that the speech cannot
be characterized as either commercial or noncommercial before the court
could proceed directly to the Central Hudson test. The risk exists that some
noncommercial speech could be subject to possible unconstitutional regula-
tion. However, the resulting "damage" would amount to no more than a
proscription on the deceptive aspects of the speech coupled with the oppor-
tunity to correct the problem and continue with the revised communication.
This alternative approach includes no built-in safeguard to protect the less
than "reasonable under the circumstances" plaintiff. It only ensures that
regulation of the deceptive speech will not be foreclosed because it cannot
be categorized as commercial. This is the least desirable alternative in terms
of effective application of the deception standard because an "unreasonable"
reaction on the part of a plaintiff acting in reliance on the advertising could
preclude regulation, since the advertising must meet the "likely to deceive"
standard to trigger its regulation.
The second alternative involves assessing the risks of the communication.
Where a strong potential for fraud, overreaching, or undue influence exists
as a result of the communication, it would be subject to regulation. The
advantage of this approach is that it considers the targeted listener's unique
set of circumstances. In Fargo, where the listener is especially vulnerable to
manipulative or intentionally vague communication, stricter standards would
be justified.
176. See supra note 57.
177. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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This approach follows the Supreme Court's rationale in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association,78 where an attorney's in-person solicitation of a
prospective client was prohibited because of the attendant risks inherent in
circumstances where high-pressure sales tactics might be used.179 In Ohralik,
the state's interest in protecting the public from the harmful aspects of
solicitation was strong enough to support the ban on in-person solicitation. 180
A seemingly important factor in the Court's analysis was the vulnerability
of the audience involved; in this case the target was an accident victim whom
the Court said was unable to properly evaluate her need for legal expertise.''
As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent in Zauderer, the printed
word is only one step removed from in-person solicitation and it is impossible
to judge its validity without first consulting the advertiser." 2 Unwitting
respondents who have been deliberately misled into calling the Help Clinic,
under the false impression that it is an abortion clinic, risk exposure to the
same kind of intimidation and undue influence that the Ohralik Court
denounced.8 3 The result of the solicitation, whether in person or in print,
is the same. The state's interest in protecting its citizens from this result
should not depend on whether the speech can be characterized as commercial
or noncommercial. Courts should be free to evaluate the conduct in terms
of the results, not just the tactics. The Ohralik Court endorsed the solicitation
ban as a "prophylactic measure" designed to prevent harm before it could
178. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
179. The Supreme Court upheld a prohibition of in-person solicitation by attorneys. An
important part of the rationale for the Court's holding was the potential for overreaching and
undue influence inherent in personal solicitation of a prospective client by a lawyer. Id. at 461-
62. Attorney Ohralik, upon learning that an acquaintance had been hurt in an accident, visited
her in the hospital with the hope of representing her in any later lawsuit. The Court found
that the direct pressure and one-sidedness of this type of selling, under these circumstances,
went beyond the constitutional protection granted in Bates v. State Bar. See supra notes 47-51
and accompanying text. The Ohralik Court noted that Virginia Pharmacy did not entitle
commercial speech to the same level of protection as noncommercial speech, emphasizing that
it takes a "subordinate position" in the "scale of first amendment values." 436 U.S. at 455-
56. Commercial speech could be regulated in furtherance of an important state interest. The
interests upheld were the protection of the public from the harmful effects of personal solicitation
and the advancement of high professional standards for the legal profession. Id. at 461. The
argument upheld in Ohralik that the solicitation ban serve a substantial state interest in
maintaining high standards among licensed professionals was rejected by the Bates Court when
offered to support the ban on lawyer advertising. However, the Arizona Bar Association's
argument in Bates was that advertising damaged the dignity of the profession. In contrast, the
Ohralik respondent's rationale was protection of the public. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
180. 436 U.S. at 461.
181. Id. at 449. Justice Marshall suggested in his concurring opinion that there might be
a different result where "honest, unpressured commercial solicitation is involved." Id. at 476
(Marshall, J., concurring). The absence of a naive, vulnerable audience may weaken the state's
public protection interest in prohibiting solicitation. Id.
182. 471 U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. 436 U.S. at 461-62.
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occur. s4 Where, as in Fargo, harm in the form of undue intimidation,
coercion, or fraudulent misrepresentation is likely to occur as a result of the
speech at issue, regulating it should be justified regardless of the form it
takes.
The third alternative approach is the establishment of a separate standard
of review for medical, personal, or professional services advertising. Com-
munications of this nature are particularly prone to deception, both inten-
tional and innocent. The Virginia Pharmacy Court recognized this, and
noted that the increased likelihood of deception inherent in advertising for
these services might necessitate different standards for evaluating the ac-
ceptability of time, place, and manner restrictions. 185 The Bates Court strongly
suggested that advertising regarding the quality of legal services could be
misleading and thus should not be allowed.1 6 In fact, three Justices filed
dissenting opinions asserting that the first amendment did not bar regulation
of legal service advertising. 18 7 They cited the increased potential for deception
and the difficulty of effective regulation in the public interest as warranting
the prohibition of price advertising for legal services.' 8
Professional and medical services are complex and diverse. The average
lay person lacks the knowledge and experience necessary to gauge the veracity
of the information or the quality of the service offered. An uninformed
decision based on one's interpretation of a misleading advertisement could
lead to seriously detrimental results. 8 9 This qualitative difference between
commercial advertising for commodity products and professional services
advertising warrants different regulatory standards.
Generally, content-based restrictions are upheld only for speech categorized
as having little or no speech value, such as obscenity and "fighting words."'' 1
Otherwise, the state must have a compelling interest in regulating the speech
if the speech is noncommercial, or a substantial interest if the speech is
commercial. 9  Under this third alternative, regulation of medical, profes-
sional, or personal services advertising would give rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of a valid state interest. The state has an interest in alleviating the
dangers that can result from innocent misrepresentation or intentional fraud.
184. Id. at 464.
185. 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
186. Bates, 433 U.S. at 366.
187. Id. at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 390-91
(Powell, J., Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Id. at 391 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Burger
noted that the nonstandardized aspect of legal services made advertising difficult to regulate.
Id. at 386-87 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. See generally Note, We Can Share the Women, supra note 7, at 1116 (arguing that
harms associated with alcohol consumption justify regulations on advertising that might be
unacceptable if applied to less hazardous products).
190. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (1942). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
191. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (substantial state interest is just one of four
criteria for regulating commercial speech).
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These dangers are inherent in advertising for special services, because of the
nature of the harm that can befall consumers who act in reliance on this
advertising. 92 Physical as well as mental health may be at risk.
Regulation of cigarette advertising has been upheld in the interest of
promoting public health. Even though limiting the ways that manufacturers
could promote cigarettes infringed on their first amendment rights, courts
have upheld the Congressional regulations as permissible under the first
amendment.'93 Similarly, regulations on medical, personal, or professional
services advertising can be justified on the grounds of protecting public
health. The burden would be on the advertiser to prove that the public
health interest was not implicated under the particular facts of the case. In
Fargo, for example, the Help Clinic would have the burden of showing that
the mental or physical well-being of its unsuspecting customers was not
detrimentally affected as a result of visiting the Clinic in reliance on its
advertising.
The second alternative approach, which permits regulation where there is
greater risk of overreaching and undue influence, best facilitates effective
application of the deception standard to cases like Fargo. The "likely to
deceive" test protects consumers who act reasonably under the circumstances.
The unwitting Help Clinic patrons may be incapable of reasonable behavior
precisely because of the circumstances. The extremely personal, emotional,
and often troublesome nature of the abortion issue produces a highly charged
situation that makes the reasonable person deception standard difficult to
apply. A Help Clinic victim, however, may be left unprotected because the
response resulting from her confrontation with the Help Clinic is not de-
monstrably reasonable. The second alternative incorporates the higher prob-
ability of "unreasonableness" into its analysis; the more vulnerable and
easily manipulated the target audience, the greater the potential for over-
reaching and undue influence, and the stronger the case for regulation. Once
it is established that the situation demands regulation, the degree of reason-
ableness necessarily becomes less of a concern in determining whether the
conduct is likely to deceive.
The third alternative, which suggests a different standard of review for
medical, personal, and professional services advertising, also mitigates against
the dangers of the reasonable person deception standard in special situations
like Fargo. Since the two part rationale for this alternative includes the
seriousness of the harm that could result and the average lay person's lack
192. See generally Note, We Can Share the Women, supra note 7 (asserting that harms
associated with alcohol abuse are so extensive they establish a compelling state interest in
regulating speech).
193. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971). The statutory prohibition against
radio and television advertising for cigarettes, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970), enacted because labeling
regulations had not reduced the incidence of smoking, also was upheld for public health reasons.
333 F.Supp. at 585-86.
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of knowledge or experience about these services, an unreasonable response
resulting from naivete and the character of the services offered already is
taken into account.
CONCLUSION
Vague and unworkable standards, existent in the regulation of commercial
speech, undermine the consumer benefit rationale advanced as a justification
for limited first amendment protection of commercial speech. At the heart
of the problem is the insistence upon the classification of all speech as either
commercial or noncommercial. In a marketplace of goods and services, all
advertising plays both informational and transaction-motivating roles. The
objective is the same-to encourage the reader to take action, be it in the
political, ideological, or commercial sense. The line between informing and
selling is usually unclear, whether one is dealing in abortion as a commodity
service, or abortion alternatives as a value choice.1 94 Likewise, it is an
oversimplification to state that the existence of the commercial speaker's
profit motive precludes any chance that his advertising will provide noncom-
mercial information of value to the public, or conversely, that the noncom-
mercial speaker's advocacy of a cause will not result in economic action on
the part of the listener. 95 As Justice Blackmun stated in Bigelow, "[t]he
relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does
not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.' '1 96
Commercial and noncommercial elements are present in many types of
communication. An adept advertiser may be able to add enough noncom-
mercial characteristics to an advertisement with a purely commercial motive
and gain the benefit of full first amendment protection. The reluctance to
adopt regulatory standards for communication that falls into a gray area
should be overcome in order to meet the first amendment objective of
providing a free flow of information and ultimately benefit the consumer,
be it a consumer of products or ideas. Deception should be attacked re-
gardless of the nature of the speech.
Terry Kirk
194. See generally Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 1278 n.364 (asking people to share values
versus seeking to influence private economic decisions does not clearly divide commercial from
noncommercial speech).
195. See Redish, supra note 77, at 443-48 (people have difficulty distinguishing between
commercial and noncommercial speech in their decision-making).
196. 421 U.S. at 826.
